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CRITICAL THEORY AND THE LONELINESS OF 
THE TAX PROF 
ERIK M. JENSEN* 
This essay has two goals: to suggest why feminist and critical 
race commentary (what I'll call the New Criticism) is spreading in 
taxation and, in the course of evaluating some specific examples of 
the New Criticism, to discuss some dangers of that criticism. 
I. WHY THE NEW CRITICISM HAS COME TO TAX LAW 
My first thesis-ultimately unprovable, I admit-is that the 
emergence of New Criticism writing is attributable to the fact that tax 
professors are often isolated within their faculties, set apart by a 
sense that tax law is fundamentally different from other law school 
subjects.1 The New Criticism is an attempt to link tax scholarship 
with the work of other law professors and with the work of faculty on 
other parts of university campuses.2 And it's an attempt to get notice 
in a way that has become increasingly common in the academy. 
Tax professors are the air-fresheners of the American law 
school. If a tax prof tries to talk about serious tax research with a 
bunch of law school generalists, the room clears out instantly. We tax 
law types are expected to sit, without nodding off, through 
interminable discussions on Satanism and the First Amendment. But 
raise one tax question with a con law person, and he's gone: "Sorry. 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I thank my colleague Jon 
Entin for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft. He does not necessarily 
subscribe to the substantive points in the essay, and he is of course not responsible for any 
defects that remain. 
1. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be 
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (describing two "myths," "that tax 
lawyers are somehow different from other lawyers" and that "tax law is somehow different 
from other areas of the law"); see also David A. Hyman, Procedural Intersection and 
Special Pleading: Is Tax Different?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1729,1744 (1997) ("Tax scholarship 
and administration [are] already too isolated from the insights of other areas of the law." 
(citing Caron, supra)). 
2. Decidedly not including the scientists and engineers. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The 
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767 
(1987) ("[C]hemistry has not ceased to be an autonomous discipline just because there is 
more political diversify among chemists today than there was thirty years ago."). 
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I just remembered I have to meet with a student. "3 
It's not as though the con law discussions are always dealing with 
issues substantively more important than taxation. Whether 
expenditures can be currently deducted under the income tax, for 
example, has far more immediate consequences to many people 
(whether they realize it or not) than the First Amendment's 
treatment of Satanism.4 And debates about the nature of the tax 
system implicate just about everything important in public policy-
making. Not even Satan can plausibly claim that. 
I'm not suggesting that con law isn't important, and I like con 
law discussions-sometimes.5 My point is that con lawyers and 
others don't return the favor. As law professors, we ought to be able 
to explain our work to other intelligent people6 who will make some 
effort to comprehend the explanations (maybe even reading an 
article or two to help the explanation along). But when it comes to 
taxation, the other folks don't even try.7 
As a result, tax professors often don't talk to non-tax folks, and 
the typical law faculty has only a couple of tax teachers. Yes, we 
have telephones, and the T AXPROF bulletin board has brought 
quite a few tax scholars together for electronic bull sessions. 
Furthermore, those of us in big cities can profit from contact with the 
local bar. But Ma Bell, the Internet, and downtown lawyers are poor 
substitutes for being able to plop onto a colleague's couch and ask 
the "What about this?" and "Did you see that article?" questions that 
should make academic life so rewarding. 
No one wants to talk to us, and no one except (maybe) other tax 
lawyers wants to read what we write. The sense of isolation from law 
school colleagues is ,exacerbated by the perceived reluctance of top 
student-edited law reviews, the reviews that non-tax people see, to 
accept tax articles. Once in a blue moon a top-ten review will take a 
3. Unspoken: "If necessary, I'll go find one in the student lounge." 
4. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Where the Action Is: Congress, Not the Supreme Court, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1994, at A15 (noting that Congress deals with hot issues, while 
Supreme Court Justices are left to handle bankruptcy and American Indian law cases). 
5. Personal liberties are fundamentally important, and perceptions of what the 
Constitution does and doesn't permit affect the moral tone of society. But, despite the 
great selling job con law types have done, whether someone can burn an American flag 
without prosecution has significance to most people only at a very abstract level. 
6. Student editors: you are not supposed to challenge-or attempt to verify-this 
characterization of law professors. 
7. Cf Caron, supra note 1, at 527 (" 'If you pick tax work, you're already picking a 
job that is going to isolate you.'" (quoting Dan Hurley, Why Are Young Lawyers the 
Loneliest People in the Profession?, BARRISTER, Summer 1987, at 9, 10)). 
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serious, technical, doctrinal tax article, but blue moons don't seem to 
come around as much as they used to.8 
The 'problem is twofold; First is the prevailing preference in 
legal scholarship for grand unified theories. As Paul Caron has 
noted, "Current trends in legal scholarship favoring 'abstract theory' 
at the expense of more traditional, 'practical' work may place tax 
professors at a competitive disadvantage with their non tax peers. "9 
Whether Caron's competitive-disadvantage point is correct or not,10 
it's true that doctrinal work is not as valued in the academy as it once 
was. 
Second, tax profs are more likely these days to bypass the 
student-edited reviews that other law profs publish in. Those reviews 
aren't the best places for tax types if they want their stuff to be 
published on a timely basis and to be seen by other tax specialists. 
But it's a dilemma. Write for generalist reviews11 and you run the 
risk that tax professionals, especially those outside academe, won't 
see the articles. But if you publish in technical tax publications, your 
academic colleagues-those people who think you're from another 
planet to begin with-may characterize the work as insufficiently 
theoreticaU2 Publish in Tax Notes, say, and you may be slitting your 
throat if you hope to be promoted, or otherwise rewarded, for 
"scholarly" effort.B 
So what do you do if you want to break out of the tax~people­
are-weird box and be noticed by colleagues who aren't tax nerds? 
8. Cf William J. Turnier, The Changing Venue for Tax (and Lots of Other) 
Scholarship 3-4 (Nov. 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review) (providing data showing the steady decline of the total percentage of all tax 
articles in major law reviews from approximately 12% in the 1940s to 2-3% in the last 
decade). 
9. Caron, supra note 1, at 523-24 (footnotes omitted). 
10. I'm not sure it is; traditionalists in many legal fields are unhappy about the extent 
to which abstract theory has supplanted doctrinal analysis. Cf Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 34, 34 (1992) ("[M]any law schools ... have abandoned their proper place, by 
emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy."). 
11. Assuming you can find one with editors brave enough to accept a tax article. 
12. Without having read it, of course. 
13. I wrote a short essay, only partly tongue-in-cheek, urging that Tax Notes, which 
has become the tax professional's bible, change its name to something more pompously 
academic, like the Harvard Tax Journal. See Erik M. Jensen, Tax Notes by Any Other 
Name WouldSmell Sweeter, 74 TAX NOTES 641 (1997). It was an issue that struck a 
chord, attracting several professorial letters of support and a practitioner rebuttal. 
Despite its name, Tax Notes is great. A recent anthology of about 150 tax articles 
included more from Tax Notes than from any other publication. See Letter from Paul 
Caron, 74 TAX NOTES 966 (1997), noted in Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, at Al. 
' '" 
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Here, finally, is my real point: you come up with some highfalutin', 
and therefore probably off-the-wall, theory to e)\plain part or all of 
the world-a theory that is " 'brilliantly' novel and counterintuitive 
rather than ... sensible," in Daniel Farber's words.14 In his The Case 
Against Brilliance, Farber wrote, "The ... traits of novelty, surprise, 
and unconventionality that are considered marks of distinction in 
other fields should be considered suspect in ... law, in which 
thoughtfulness may be a more important virtue."15 
By throwing in a little feminism and critical race theory, you can 
make waves that the legal academy is afraid not to reward and that 
law review editors adore. In addition, you might even get mentioned 
in the morning newspapers: "Professor Says Tax System Unfair to 
__ "-fill in the blank with your favorite "traditionally subordinated 
group."16 Sure, this strategy might not work to make you famous, but 
you're a lot more likely to get noticed than if you carefully consider 
the treatment of liabilities in limited partnerships. 
At a 1995 conference, Edward McCaffery (about whom more 
will follow) complained that issues of race, gender, and class have not 
been addressed very much by tax professors, who have instead 
"focused on more narrow and technical issues in business and 
financial taxation."17 Those narrow, technical issues are the stuff the 
rest of the legal academics don't want to hear about, but they're also 
the issues that affect the tax bar-that is, issues that students will 
have to address as practicing lawyers. The New Criticism is doing its 
part to redress the tax academy's traditional insistence on connection 
with the real world of practice. 
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE U G,LY IN THE NEW CRITICISM 
My second thesis is that the New Criticism isn't taking us in a 
desirable direction. 
I've used more than a little hyperbole to this point, and I don't 
really mean to suggest the New Criticism is all bad. If a critic can 
demonstrate that the Internal Revenue Code has had unfortunate 
14. Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367,367 (1987). 
15. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917 (1986). 
16. See Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA 
1, 2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) ("What is missing from both the 
political and the academic debate about taxes is a serious consideration of how the tax 
system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated 
groups."). 
17. Edward McCaffery, Statement at "Taxation and the Family" Conference at Lewis 
and Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995), quoted in Rebecca S. Rudnick, 
Taxation and the Family, 69 TAX NOTES 421, 421 (1995): 
1998] CRITICAL TAX THEORY 1757 
effects on particular groups (call this "mild" feminism or "mild" 
critical race theory), we certainly ought to know that. For example, 
work on the Code's unhappy effects on women and families is often 
worthy of praise.18 And materials that are marketed as New 
Criticism sometimes look surprisingly traditionai.l9 
But even when New Criticism articles have merit, one might 
quibble about how much feminism or critical race theory helps us to 
understand discriminatory effects that could have been unearthed 
with more traditional analysis and that could have been described 
without the loaded, offputting language that often accompanies the 
New Criticism.20 
And as aids to interpreting the Code as it is and as practicing 
lawyers must understand it, the new perspectives are often irrelevant. 
Is there really a feminist or critical race understanding of business 
taxation, which is, after all, what most tax lawyers do? Worse, the 
more extreme proponents of the New Criticism contribute to the idea 
that the Code is so morally flawed that it ought to be open to any new 
interpretive technique, whether or not grounded in statutory text, 
structure, or legislative history. In shaking the foundations of the 
Code, New Critics take positions-for example, that the 
interpretation of statutory provisions may vary depending on the 
gender of the interpreter-that may be inconsistent with the idea of 
law itself. Weakening the rule of law is helpful to no one-certainly 
not to the practicing bar and our students.21 
18. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); Anne L. Alstott, 
Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. 
REv. 2001 (1996). But see infra notes 75-104 and accompanying text (dis<;ussing Taxing 
Women). , · 
19. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16. Taxing America is part of a series 
labeled Critical America by the New York University Press, and the purpose of the 
volume is to "develop an analytical framework [that] would both uncover biases in the tax 
law and reveal antisubordirtation strategies to keep the tax law from maintaining and 
perpetuating marketplace discrimination." Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, 
Preface to TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16, at vii, vii. The introductory sections contain 
politically loaded terms like "subordination of persons," Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise 
Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA, supra note 16, at 1, 3, and a few of the 14 
essays follow suit. But much of the volume is traditional in its analysis. If I were a radical 
and had spent my own money for the book thinking it was a guide to the revolution, I'd 
want a refund. 
20. Cf. Jennifer Hochschild, Book Review, 7 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 416,417 (Sept. 
1997), available at <http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/sarat97.htm> (reviewing 
RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
(Austin Sarat ed., 1997)) ("[An argument s]tripped of its (to me irritating) linguistic 
pretensions ... could be important as well as provocative. But I confess to having a hard 
time seeing the forest for all the rather florid trees."). 
21. Judge Posner recently wrote that "the foundations [of traditional jUrisprudence] 
r 
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In this section I examine a few selected articles and books to 
evaluate the contributions of the New Criticism. Obviously this will 
not be a comprehensive examination of all aspects of the New 
Criticism; it can't be. Suffice it to say that in general I subscribe to 
the criticisms of Professor Zelenak that begin this Symposium,22 but I 
have a few additional points to make. 
A. Critical Race Theory: Moran & Whitford 
Critical race theory ("CRT") seems to be a posture rather than a . 
well-developed set of principles. It has been linked to storytelling 
(the so-called "narrative" movement), but, in A Black Critique of the 
Internal Revenue Code,23 Professors Beverly Mot:an and William 
Whitford suggest that storytelling is not a necessary component of 
CRT: "[H]ostile critics of critical race theory have placed too much 
emphasis on the use of narrative, and not enough emphasis on the 
theory of systematic racial subordination in American society."24 
They state that " [ o ]ne main thrust of critical race theory is a belief 
that racial subordination is everywhere, a structural aspect of all parts 
of American society."25 
I question the use of the term "theory" in this context.26 Is there 
really no evidence that would convince a critical race theorist that 
racial subordination is not present in one part of American society? 
In any event, the "systematic-racial-subordination" thesis isn't used 
as a basis for testing. Instead, it provides prepackaged conclusions 
for any analysis.27 Given the extraordinarily broad terms in which 
Moran and Whitford describe the "theory," I suppose it has to. If we 
posit that subordination is everywhere, we'll look for it-and find 
have been kicked away. Today we are all skeptics." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 453 (1990). That's true, but only up to a point. The 
whole enterprise-the rule of law-should not be up for grabs. 
22. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
1521 (1998). 
23. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751. 
24. ld. at 756. 
25. Id. at 751-52. 
26. In their conclusion, Moran and Whitford instead refer to the "critical race theory 
tradition that racial subordination infects virtually all American institutions." Id. at 799 
(emphasis added). 
27. Cf DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE 
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 127 (1997) ("[M)ulticulturalism ... 
can defeat challenges by depriving critics of any ground from which to mount a 
challenge."). 
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it-everywhere.28 
Critical race scholarship has been criticized as being "unduly 
abstract and ideological,"29 but Moran and Whitford can't be accused 
of abstractness. They focus on a number of specific Internal Revenue 
Code provisions-involving statutory benefits affecting wealth and 
wealth transfers,30 homeownership,31 and employment,32 and the 
detriment of the marriage penalty33-to demonstrate how those 
provisions discriminate against blacks: "Our hypothesis is that 
deviations from . the ideal of a comprehensive income tax 
systematically favor whites over blacks."34 
Moran and Whitford are not always clear in distinguishing 
between cases in which the Code has different effects because blacks 
and whites, on the average, are in different economic circumstances 
before imposition of any tax, and cases in which the Code has 
different effects on blacks and whites in approximately the same pre-
tax economic positions. Those two flaws, assuming that both can be 
attributed to the Code in the first place, are hardly of the same moral 
28. And we'll be inclined to reject, without analysis, any suggestions that the 
"theory" is flawed. See id. at 134 (discussing some critical race theorists' characterization 
of opponents as being engaged in "backlash scholarship," undeserving of any response 
that seeks to engage the criticism on a reasoned basis). 
29. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
147, 163 (1994). . 
30. Including the fair-market-value basis rule applicable for transfers of property at 
death, the reduced tax rate for capital gains, the exclusion from gross income of gifts 
received, and the basis rule (usually carryover) applicable to property transferred by gift. 
See Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 755 (citing I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1(h), 102, 1015 (1994 
& West Supp. 1998)). 
3L Including the home-mortgage-interest deduction, property-tax deduction, the 
(now repealed) provision permitting the rollover of gain on the sale of a principal 
residence, and the exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence. See id. (citing 
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(1), 163(h)(2)(D), 164(a)(1), 121 (West Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 1034, 
repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(b), 111 Stat. 788, 839). 
32. Specifically Keogh plans, IRAs, pensions, and employer-provided health 
insurance. See id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 401(c), 219, 408, 401(a)(1), 501(a), 106 (West Supp. 
1998)). 
33. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1998) (providing different rate schedules 
for married persons filing jointly and unmarried persons). 
34. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 753. Moran and Whitford focus on the 
income tax, despite the article's title, which seems to look to the Internal Revenue Code 
as a whole. The ideal is the "Glenshaw Glass goal of taxing all 'accessions to wealth, 
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.' " Id. at 759 
(quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)). It's more than a 
little peculiar to characterize a statutory-interpretation case as having established a 
"goal" to which a perfect definition of "income" should aspire. The Court in Glenshaw 
Glass was merely interpreting the language of I.R.C. § 61 defining "gross income"; it had 
no reason to consider the merits of that definition or the legitimacy of the statutory 
exclusions from income that Moran and Whitford examine. 
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order. 
Of course it's true that high-income and high-wealth taxpayers 
are able to take advantage of many more deduction and exclusion 
provisions (and other provisions that have similar effects) than low-
income and low-wealth taxpayers can. That's a trivial point,35 but 
Moran and Whitford sometimes treat it as if it were an indictment of 
the Internal Revenue Code as a whole.36 For example, they answer 
the rhetorical question "Is there a black view on income averaging?" 
with an emphatic "Yes. "37 When income averaging was available, 
blacks were disproportionately unable to take advantage of the 
concept, and blacks in general therefore had no reason to think it was 
very important.38 
I'm not sure why the fact that relatively few blacks could use 
income averaging affects our analysis of whether income averaging is 
a good thing conceptually, and I'm bothered by an evaluative 
criterion that looks so blatantly to self-interest, even group self-
interest.39 A what's-in-it-for-me standard is not something the 
academy should be encouraging.40 
But I'm probably being unfair to Professors Moran and Whitford 
in attacking the income-averaging point, which isn't the centerpiece 
of their article.41 Their more important criticism is that some 
(many?) Code provisions affect blacks and whites of otherwise 
approximately equal economic station in different ways: "We believe 
that, even at the same incomes, the typical black and the typical white 
35. My favorite statement in the article is that "[t]he data on blacks and wealth tells 
us that blacks own very little wealth and that this lack of wealth is at least partially 
responsible for the continuing black/white wealth gap." Id. at 779. 
36. I am not defending black-white income differences; I am questioning whether a 
Code provision that has different effects on people with different incomes is somehow 
morally flawed. 
37. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 752. In general, income averaging 
permitted taxpayers whose income had increased over a five-year period to pay the tax 
that would have been due if the income had been earned ratably over that period. 
Income averaging thus moderated the effects of a progressive tax structure. 
38. See id. The question was asked by a tax professor in reaction to Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Under-
standings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39. 
39. I have no doubt that blacks who could make use of income averaging liked it, and 
whites who could not do so were less likely to be enthusiastic. 
40. I recognize that some theories· in political science and economics can be 
interpreted, at worst, as promoting self-interest to the exclusion of any conception of the 
public good, or, at best, as showing indifference to the quality of choices made by 
individuals. I'll nevertheless stand by my statement in the text. 
41. But they do criticize other Code provisions on the ground that high-income 
people can make better use of them-for example, the exclusion for gifts. See Moran & 
Whitford, supra note 23, at 762-63. 
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lead different lives, largely as a result of the American history of 
racial subordination."42 That's often because blacks and whites, on 
the whole, acquire different kinds of assets. Studies show "that 
blacks hold a higher percentage of their wealth in consumption items 
than whites do, and a lesser percentage in financial and investment 
assets."43 Apparently this asset distribution is itself evidence of racial 
subordination. But whether it is or not, blacks can't take advantage 
of Code provisions favoring investment assets as much as whites do.44 
Moran and Whitford often write as if they were unaware that 
some Code provisions are intended to change behavior, not to take 
existing behavior for granted.45 • Surely national policy ought to be 
able to encourage investment in financial assets rather than 
consumption-that is, to encourage savings-without a charge that 
the policy discriminates against blacks.46 If black Americans aren't 
investing as much as whites in tax-favored assets, even when 
adjusting for income and wealth levels, black Americans are 
voluntarily forgoing tax benefits available to them. Rejecting the 
incentives of national policy isn't subordination; it's choice.47 
The most fundamental problem with the Moran-Whitford study 
is that, as far as I can tell, it leads to nothing but despair. Moran and 
Whitford couple their charge of "systematic racial subordination" 
with the following disclaimer: "[W]e want to make clear that we are 
not asking a question about discriminatory intent. ... [L]egislators 
are largely unaware of the Internal Revenue Code's impact on 
42 Id. at 757. 
43. Id. at 768. 
44. Some of the Moran-Whitford illustrations are silly. For example, they suggest 
that "[d]epreciated properties, such as cars and real estate in inner city slum 
neighborhoods, are disfavored if they are capital assets because a taxpayer is often unable 
to deduct losses resulting from these properties." Id. at 762 (citing sections dealing with 
deductibility of capital losses). If the assets are held for personal purposes, routine losses 
aren't deductible for anyone, black or white. Unless I'm mistaken, the cars of whites-
even suburban whites-don't increase in value over time, yet white taxpayers aren't 
entitled to take any loss deduction on sales of personal cars. 
45. They aren't really unaware of this, of course, see id. at 802 (discussing incentive 
effects), but their extended criticism generally ignores incentive effects. 
46. Moran and Whitford state, "The lifestyles that blacks lead today may be the 
lifestyles that whites lead tomorrow. If whites want to keep. the Internal Revenue Code 
best serving their interests, they must pay attention to how the Code ill serves blacks." 
Id. at 802 n.176. But Congress bas no intellectually justifiable reason to be indifferent to 
lifestyles that do not promote an acceptable level of national saving. National policy 
ought to ensure that excessive consumption does not become the lifestyle of any 
significant part of the population. 
47. In any event, speaking in group terms, black versus white, misstates the nature of 
the behavior involved. Group decisions aren't being made; the group data reflect the 
aggregation of individual choices. 
I' 
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blacks."48 But I'd almost prefer a statement that the discrimination is 
intentional; then we could imagine doing something about it 
If racial subordination is really so pervasive that it exists even 
when legislators are drafting facially neutral tax statutes, with the 
best of intentions, what in the world are people of good will to do? 
Indeed, can there be any people of good will? 
Moran and Whitford do provide specific recommendations for 
change, ones that a hypothetical Black Congress might enact, but 
those changes make little sense without an analysis of the racial 
effects of the Code as a whole.49 Moran and Whitford say they 
"believe that this ignorance is one of the reasons for structural racial 
subordination in America,"50 but they aren't really advocating a 
research and educational campaign. Instead the remedy for 
ignorance is apparently to elect more blacks to Congress: "We 
suggest that the Code reflects systematic black political 
underrepresentation in the halls of power."51 That's 'not a statement 
about principle, about law. It's about power, and even then it's 
academic in the worst sense. Obviously there will never be enough 
blacks in Congress to enact the legislation of the Moran-Whitford 
Black Congress. 52 The remedy is therefore-nothing? 
Moran and Whitford make it all sound hopeless, but I'm glad to 
say they aren't convincing. Despite their gloom, we aren't yet at the 
point where the law doesn't matter.53 
B. Handelman on Feminist Statutory Interpretation 
Professor Gwen Handelman has posited some feminist principles 
that, she says, ought to guide interpretation of the Internal Revenue 
48. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 758. 
49. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1561-74. Moran and Whitford recognize that, by 
focusing on only a few Code provisions, their article may be incomplete, but they go 
ahead to test "our method," see Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 754, as if a method 
that tests incomplete data might nonetheless be valid. 
50. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 758. 
51. ld. at 801. 
52. If it could happen, we presumably would have disproved the subordination-is-
everywhere thesis of critical race theory. 
53. In a widely noted 1984 essay, Paul Carrington questioned the foundations of the 
critical legal studies movement, and I suggest that one of his conclusions applies to critical 
race theorists as well: "One cannot believe in the worth of one's professional skill and 
judgment as a lawyer unless one also has some minimal belief in the idea of law and the 
institutions that enforce it." Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 222, 226 (1984); see also id. at 227 ("More than a few lawyers lack competence 
because they have lost, or never acquired, the needed confidence that law matters."). 
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Code and the Treasury Regulations that explicate the Code.54 "It 
may be time for the bar," she writes, "and particularly tax lawyers 
whose work is at the heart of the democratic process, to hear and 
sometimes speak in a different voice."55 
Handelman's interpretive principles are intended to limit the 
extent to which tax lawyers can recommend aggressive return 
positions to their clients. "[P]rivate practitioners, who are not 
politically authorized decisionmakers, should constrain interpretation 
of a tax statute to the meaning assigned by decisionmakers who have 
political authority: legislative, judicial or administrative,"56 rather 
than developing their own imaginative-and overly aggressive-
interpretation of a provision. 
Although deferring to political decisionmakers has a statist ring 
to it, as Handelman recognizes,57 this is a defensible beginning 
interpretive principle. It is, in some respects, a public-spirited 
conception of a lawyer's responsibilities. The law doesn't merely 
provide a few prohibitions beyond which anything goes; it sets-or 
should set-standards higher than a client's narrow, selfish interests 
would dictate.58 
But by itself the Handelman proposal is hardly a striking 
innovation.59 Nor is her suggestion that historical analysis should 
guide the inquiry into meaning: "A careful inquiry into historical 
fact, motivated by a genuine desire to grasp the communication 
represented by legislation, offers the best chance for ascertaining how 
those who crafted it would have wanted the statute to apply in 
circumstances not expressly provided for or perhaps not even 
specifically contemplated. "60 That means, I take it, that original 
understanding, as well as we can discern it, should guide our present 
understanding of a statute or regulation. To which I say, Hear! 
Hear!61 
54. See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of 
Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1993). 
55. Id. at 76. 
56. I d. at 53. 
57. "I concede considerable unease with the degree of deference to political authority 
that I prescribe .... Is the different voice that has found expression in my work the voice 
of submission?" I d. at 63. 
58. See id. at 60. 
59. I don't mean to suggest that's a bad thing, as I've already noted, since much that 
is really new or striking in political-legal matters is often nonsense. 
60. Handelman, supra note 54, at 55. 
61. Lest I seem simple-minded in the extreme, I want to emphasize that legal and 
other developments may make applying original understanding impossibie. For example, 
I don't advocate invalidating the use of paper money, even though the Constitution fairly 
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What makes the Handelman position "new" is using feminist 
language to justify and further develop these princi:ples.62 "[M]en and 
women might approach the reading of tax statutes differently,"63 and 
that difference affects the way we should approach interpretation. 
Trying to understand the "communication" represented by a statute 
or regulation, she writes, "is an exercise in empathic understanding, 
stepping into the shoes of the drafter and assessing what the words 
mean from that viewpoint."64 
Empathic understanding is a feminine skill: "[S]tatutory 
interpretation as conversation may resonate with women's 
experience but is the stuff of fantasy (or nightmare) to men. The 
nature of the male orientation and its position of dominance in 
American society makes it more difficult for men to recognize a 
reality other than their own."65 Not impossible-"men are not 
entirely incapable of attentiveness to others and empathic 
understanding if not demanded in a context that requires that they 
assume a one-down position"66-but difficult.67 
Whew! I guess that means that anything I say on the subject 
should be discounted, but, with some trepidation, I'll go ahead 
anyway. For one thing, I'm inclined to giggle at the thought of 
"empathic understanding" helping to understand municipal bond 
arbitrage provisions or continuity-of-interest regulations. 
But that cute point aside, think about how the Handelman 
analysis would play out in the real world. Historically nearly all 
drafters of statutes and regulations were male. It may be difficult 
"for men to recognize a reality other than their own," but the voices 
we're trying to hear and understand in tax law are more likely to be 
basses than sopranos. The reality we're trying to discern-if we have 
to use this distasteful language at all-is a male reality. 
Is Handelman suggesting that women are better than men at 
clearly does not permit such currency. See Erik M. Jensen, The Meaning of "Direct 
Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2417-19 
(1997) (discussing, among other things, the Legal Tender Cases). 
62. In an earlier article, Handelman had not adopted an explicitly feminist 
orientation to her recommendations. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of 
Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 
611, 613-15 (1991). 
63. Handelman, supra note 54, at 41. 
64. I d. at 55. 
65. I d. at 68. 
66. I d. at 72. 
67. This "approach to statutory interpretation requires interpreters to engage in 
conduct that may be extremely emotionally difficult for men." Id. at 69. 
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understanding what men were getting at when they drafted tax 
provisions? Men and women think differently-that's the premise of 
the enterprise-but women are better at understanding benighted 
male thinking patterns than men are?68 To say the least, I'm 
skeptical. If we're really trying to understand gender-based thinking, 
which in this case must mean male thinking, I believe I'd hire a male 
tax lawyer to do my work. Why compensate a woman for the extra 
time (and agony) required to put herself into the mind of a male? 
Of course, in most cases we can't actually talk to the drafters to 
discern statutory or regulatory meaning: using a legislator's or staff 
person's post hoc rationalizations for a provision isn't an often-
followed (or permitted) method of interpretation. So the "empathic 
understanding" that must be used in Handelman's scheme, as we 
participate in the "communication" or "conversation" that she 
describes, is necessarily far removed from what it might be in a one-
on-one context. Indeed, if we're interpreting older statutes and 
regulations, we might very well be trying to empathize with drafters 
who are long since dead. 
What does "empathic understanding" mean under those 
circumstances other than trying to understand a text?69 Maybe 
women are superior to men at reading texts, but I'd like to see some 
evidence to support that proposition.70 In any case, it's hard to see 
what "empathic understanding" has to do with it. 
Now, obviously Handelman can't mean that men and women 
think in ways that are so fundamentally different that communication 
is impossible. And in discussing communitarian ideals-men are 
individualistic, women are communal, and communal is better71-
Handelman stresses that coming to agreement on the meaning of 
statutory and regulatory provisions is desirable: "[F]or a national 
community to endure, the unifying energy of the federal income tax 
68. I think all Handelman was saying in the passages quoted above, see supra text 
accompanying notes 63-67, is that women try harder to empathize with men than men try 
to empathize with women. It's quite a step from that proposition to conclude that women 
are better at understanding what men mean than men are. 
69. "Text" need not mean "disembodied text," see Handelman, supra note 54, at 65, 
if that term is intended to suggest that history, purpose, and context should be ignored. I 
mean only to distinguish a written product from the sort of real conversation in which 
participants can derive meaning from nonverbal signals. 
70. Carol Gilligan's studies, which deal with interpersonal relations, not textual 
interpretation, are hardly appropriate evidence for this purpose. See CAROL GILLIGAN, 
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982), discussed in Handelman, supra note 54, at 47-49; see also Zelenak, supra note 22, 
at 1560-61 (discussing the irrelevance of Gilligan's analysis). 
71. See Handelman, supra note 54, at 58. 
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must be preserved. "72 
All of which suggests that different readings for different parties 
isn't the goal, and a good thing too. Accepting the idea that 
principles cannot be divorced from the adherents of those 
principles-or that statutory meaning depends on the sex of the 
interpreter-would lead to the end of serious discourse, and of law 
itself. "Focusing on the tax system as a means to strengthen the 
community," writes Handelman, "I am fearful of the disintegrating 
effects of an 'every-man-for-himself approach to statutory 
ambiguity.'m I agree with that point, but I am no less concerned 
about an every-gender-for-itself approach to interpretation. 
Professor Handelman's basic interpretive principles have merit, 
but the feminist rhetoric doesn't strengthen her case and it will bring 
her few readers from the tax bar.74 The presentation of her theory 
may appeal to law review editors and other academics-surely that's 
the purpose of the enterprise-but that's not the ultimately 
dispositive audience for a theory of statutory interpretation. 
C. McCaffery and Taxing Women 
In his new book Taxing Women,75 Professor Edward McCaffery 
has expanded some ideas that he had previously advanced in the law 
review literature about gender discrimination. Such discrimination is 
built-often intentionally, he argues-into the Internal Revenue 
Code, but tax profs focus instead on the narrow technical stuff. 76 
We've worn blinders: "The mainstream tax policy academy 
legitimated the structure of tax with a rhetoric of fairness, neutrality, 
72. Id. at 56-57; see also id. at 57 ("Revenue is essential to the practical success of 
efforts to address common problems; the process of revenue collection can also identify 
and create commonalities." (emphasis added)). 
There already may be more common thinking about the extent to which the tax code 
should be used to reach redistributive justice than Handelman supposes-or wants. See 
William J. Turnier et al., Redistributive Justice and Cultural Feminism, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 
1275, 1315 (1996) (concluding "that there is little difference between women and men in 
their attitudes toward major redistributive justice issues involving tax fairness and social 
spending"). 
73. Handelman, supra note 54, at 61. 
74. See Caron, supra note 1, at 526-27 (noting the relatively small number of female 
tax lawyers). Another article that contains fascinating insights that then get lost in a 
feminist haze is Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax 
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). The feminist 
orientation clearly gives the article a mystique it would otherwise not have. But it also 
makes it something to be read largely by the converted. 
75. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18. 
76. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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and common sense.'m And we've put blinders on our students: "The 
typical tax student, like politicians, scholars, and most Americans, 
simply never sees the issues."78 
Apparently no one has been paying attention: "Americans 
generally are not seeing the biases and the inequities of tax. The 
illusion of neutrality is clouding our vision. "79 In short, "a large part 
of the obscurity of gender injustice in tax is due to the technical 
veneer of the laws."80 
It's nonsense, of course, to suggest that the American population 
has been taken in by an "illusion of neutrality." To whom has 
McCaffery been talking?81 What he must mean is that things are 
even worse than people thought-very bad indeed-and that we've 
underestimated the extent of some particular abuses, like gender 
discrimination. 
McCaffery's big point is striking: "It was with the more or less 
conscious idea of [wives and mothers as] essentially and ideally 
domestic, as stay-at-home mothers, that major elements of the tax 
law were created."82 When coupled with the historic norm that 
women should stay at home, Code provisions such as those for joint 
filing have "the effect both of leading married persons to think in 
terms of a primary and an at least potentially secondary earner, and 
of then heavily taxing that secondary earner's work outside the 
home."83 
It works like this: When the lesser-earning spouse, generally the 
77. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 1. 
78. !d. at 42. 
79. !d. at 77. 
80. !d. at 96. 
81. McCaffery elaborates: 
Once we have come to see that tax is unavoidably and pervasively political, and 
has in fact been used consciously and unconsciously in the service of particular 
political causes all along, we will be well on our way toward a better, deeper 
understanding of the life we are living .... Tax is political in spades. It is time 
we faced up to this fact. 
!d. This is news? The danger with the emphasis on law as politics is that some folks 
quickly move to the idea that law is nothing but politics. I've discussed that problem in 
Erik M. Jensen, Pragmatic Instrumentalism and the Future of American Legal Education, 
in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROBERTS. SUMMERS (Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994). 
See also ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
THEORY 271 (1982) ("Law, after all, is not religion, not physics, and not just an applied 
social science. Law is law."). 
82. McCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 3. "The tax system is marginalizing women and 
helping to keep them at home." !d. at 73. 
83. !d. at 69. 
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wife, is deciding whether it makes economic sense to work outside 
the home, the family thinks of her income as extra income, as 
marginal dollars-hence the "secondary earner" label. Her income 
therefore seems to be taxed at the relatively high marginal rate 
applicable to the couple's combined income. Evaluated that way, 
and with all the other expenses of going to work, leaving home often 
doesn't make economic sense.84 
A lot can be said for that analysis, and-although my comments 
may occasionally suggest otherwise-! admire Taxing Women a great 
deal. But the book also evidences the excesses of the New Criticism: 
McCaffery's rigor is sometimes overwhelmed by the desire to be 
provocative. At times McCaffery makes the tax system sound like a 
conspiracy.85 The legislators know what they're doing: "We see an 
explicit decision to reward the Traditionals, a conscious desire to get 
working wives back in the home, and a deliberate use of familial 
rhetoric to facilitate transfers of resources to relatively wealthy men 
"
86 But the poor benighted victims, American women, don't 
realize what is happening to them because of the "obscurity of tax."87 
And the voices of critics have, in the past at least, been suppressed.88 
Furthermore, McCaffery peppers his commentary with jargon 
that will turn off all but the already converted. His favorite word 
must be "gendered," as in "[g]endered tax laws have arisen out of 
gendered times,"89 "the gendered logic of tax,"90 "the gendered basis 
of tax,"91 and so on. "Patriarchy" comes along fairly often, too. For 
example: "Women are learning how to work within a structure laid 
down in a prior era of entrenched patriarchy .... "92 I'm sorry, but 
that language benefits dentists-from all the teeth-gnashing-more 
than it helps reasoned discourse.93 
McCaffery's ultimate recommendation is to tax men at higher 
84. The Code "leads to massive discrimination against women ... because of its 
behavioral and dynamic effects, that is, the way it shapes women's choices over time." Id. 
at 25. 
85. Even more so than Moran and Whitford, who say they view legislators as 
ignorant, not necessarily badly motivated. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 50. 
86. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 101. 
87. Id. at 102. 
88. See id. at 165 (noting "the suppression of their voices [early feminist tax critics 
Grace Ganz Blumberg and Pamela K. Gann] in the mainstream analysis"). 
89. ld. at 22. 
90. ld. at 166. 
91. Id. at 167. 
92. Id. at 4; see also id. at 269 (noting that women "must work on terms and 
conditions shaped by the forces of a patriarchal society"). 
93. See Hochschild, supra note 20, at 417. 
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rates than women, so as to accept reality-women are more likely to 
be secondary earners-and to· turn around the incentives that now 
exist in the Code. For example, "married men should be taxed more 
than married women, because men are less elastic"94-which means 
that their decisions about work are less influenced by tax effects, not 
that their muscles and joints are becoming brittle.95 Men should be 
taxed "just exactly to the point where their behavior becomes as 
sensitive to the effects of the tax as everyone else's behavior is."96 
This idea is probably more a rhetorical flourish than a serious 
policy proposal; McCaffery doesn't expect it to be enacted.97 But the 
idea is not intentionally satirical.98 Since McCaffery wants it to be 
seriously considered, I'll do so for a moment. 
It's more than a little peculiar, as McCaffery recognizes, to 
complain about incentives to keep women at home and then to 
recommend a taxing scheme ·that explicitly treats women as if they 
were generally the secondary earners.99 If the goal is to change 
perceptions, I can't imagine any policy less likely to do that. 
Anyway, we obviously can't adopt different tax schemes for men 
and women in such a blatant way. So, McCaffery argues, "the 
recommendation can, and indeed should-at least in part for 
Constitutional reasons~be couched in gender-neutral terms. We 
should tax primary earners more, and secondary earners less. "100 But 
given that the whole of Taxing Women is an analysis of how things 
really are-how the superficial neutrality of the tax laws should give 
way to realistic analysis-this suggestion to "finesse constitutional 
norms"101 in such an obvious way is extraordinarily naive. 
94. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 177. 
95. Although they are, as I can attest. 
96. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 193. 
97. See id. at 278. 
98. See id. at 200. One quasi-satirical article advocating different tax treatment for 
men and women is Susan Ellingwood, A Broad Deduction, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 28, 
1997, at 50 (citing McCaffery). But not all such proposals are intended to be funny. See, 
e.g., JUNE STEPHENSON, MEN ARE NOT COST-EFFECTIVE: MALE CRIME IN AMERICA 
(1995). Stephenson seriously and ponderously argues for the imposition of a $100 annual 
tax on each male, to make up for the costs male crime imposes on society. See id. at 360-
62. Perhaps Stephenson's biggest crime scoop is that "young men ... are the likely 
litterers." !d. at 156. You name it; men do it and then drop their gum wrappers. 
99. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 21 ("However distasteful and gendered this 
fact might be, ... not seeing that women are far more likely to be the secondary earners 
will blind us to a very large set of problems."). 
100. !d. at 277; cf Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and 
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770-74 (1988) 
(discussing "primary caretaker" rule in child custody). 
101. Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, 
,I 
I 
·, 
I 
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At bottom, the critical problem with McCaffery's construct-as 
intriguing as it often is-is that it tries to remedy more than it 
possibly can. In looking for villains, as many New Critics do, 
McCaffery gives too much blame to the Internal Revenue Code for 
women's staying at home and not nearly enough blame to society's 
norms. Tax lawyers tend to think taxation drives everything, but 
there's no tax reason why a family has to treat mom's outside-the-
home income as secondary. 
Nor does McCaffery give adequate credit to the conflicting 
desires of women. He states that nearly all working mothers are 
unhappy: "Full-time workers wish they could work part time, to have 
more time with their children; part-time ones wish they could work 
full time, to get better, perhaps more dignified jobs."102 How can any 
generally applicable tax policy take care of such inconsistent desires, 
even if we make the questionable assumption that fulfilling "desires" 
should be the goal of public policy? Different feminists want 
different things103-better work, better support for stay-at-home 
child-rearing-and, as Professor Zelenak notes, "Rather than being 
motivated by sexism, Congress may be making a good faith effort to 
address a feminist dilemma."104 Bad policy-if that's what it is-is 
not necessarily badly motivated policy. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We ought to be able to evaluate the merits of legal policy 
without using trendy (and divisive) language, conspiratorial theories, 
otherworldly standards, and all the rest of what too often is 
represented by the New Criticism. Each of the works I've examined 
makes' good points, but inost tax-sophisticated readers will soon 
conclude that it's too hard, and too unpleasant, to separate the 
praiseworthy from the bombastic. If this is what it takes for tax profs 
to feel connected to the rest of the academy, please close my office 
door on the way out. 
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 662 (1993). 
102. MCCAFFERY, supra note 18, at 247. 
103. Different people want different things. There's no market failure just because 
wants aren't satisfied. I want a Jaguar for $10,000, but I can't get one. So? 
104. Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1540. 
